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1 Introduction
One of the most startling results in dynamic optimal tax theory is the Chamley (1986)-Judd
(1985) zero capital income tax theorem. Although working in somewhat di¤erent settings,
they draw the strikingly similar conclusions: capital should not be taxed in any steady state.
The economic intuition is that the distorting taxes on the capital income depress the savings
motives, decrease capital accumulation and do harm to economic growth. To eliminate these
unpleasant distortions, capital should go untaxed in the long run. Their seminal works
stimulate a large literature called the dynamic public nance: some authors conrm the
theorem while others overturn it in di¤erent settings.
In this paper, we want to introduce the spirit of capitalism (or wealth e¤ects or status
preferences)1 into the dynamic tax theory and reexamine optimal capital taxes. The reason
why we incorporate the spirit of capitalism into the optimal tax theory is based on the
following considerations. Firstly, taxing capital income means taxing the wealthy. The
individuals with strong spirit of capitalism are probably the very wealth men in the society.
The spirit-of-capitalism channel may have insightful implications for optimal tax theory.
Secondly, some authors use the spirit-of-capitalism approach to change the modied golden-
rule result in the optimal growth literature. They (Kurz, 1968; Zou, 1994, 1995) put forward
a novel motive for savings and capital accumulation2, which may matter for taxing capital
income. Thirdly, the spirit-of-capitalism approach has been used extensively in the literature
to resolve many puzzles in economics and nance, such as the Equity Premiun Puzzle (EPP)
(Bakshi and Chen, 1996; Smith, 2001; Boileau and Rebecca, 2007), savings and wealth
accumulation (Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite, 1992; Zou, 1995), occupational choice (Doepke
and Zilibotti, 2008), wealth distribution (Luo and Young, 2009), business cycle (Boileau
and Rebecca, 2007; Karnizova, 2010), and cross-country growth di¤erences (Kurz, 1968;
Zou, 1994). In this paper, we want to examine whether and how the spirit of capitalism
a¤ects optimal capital taxes in the long run. The main conclusions drawn in this paper
overturn the Chamley-Judd results. It is shown that the limiting capital tax is not zero
generally and its sign depends only on the specications of the utility function rather than the
production technology. Furthermore, the similar formulas of optimal capital taxes are derived
in extended settings with multiple physical capitals or heterogeneous agents (capitalists and
workers).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we analyze a Ramsey
taxation model and examine optimal capital taxes in the setting with the spirit of capitalism.
In section 3, we derive the similar results in the extended model with heterogeneous agents.
The concluding remarks are presented in section 4.
1The modeling strategy of putting capital/wealth into the utility function is called as the spirit of capital-
ism (Bakshi and Chen, 1996; Boileau and Braeu, 2007; Doepke and Zilibotti, 2008; Karnizova, 2010; Smith,
2001; Zou, 1994, 1995), social status/norms (Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite, 1992; Luo and Young, 2009),
or wealth e¤ects (Kurz, 1968).
2The standard Ramsey model establishes that the net marginal product of per capita capital is equal to
the time preference rate (i.e., f 0 (kmg) = ), which is well known as the modied golden rule level of physical
capital. Whereas Kurz (1968) and Zou (1994) argue that the spirit of capitalism decreases the marginal
product of capital (i.e., f 0 (k) =    Uk=Uc <  = f
0 (kmg)) and hence increases the steady state level of
physical capital (i.e., k > kmg). Zou (1995) develops the spirit-of-capitalism approach to explain the savings
behavior of the very wealthy.
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2 The model
2.1 Model setup
Consider a production economy with no uncertainty. An innitely lived representative house-
hold likes consumption, leisure and capital streams fct; lt; ktg
1
t=0 that give higher values of
1X
t=0
tu(ct; lt; kt); (1)
where  2 (0; 1) is the time discount rate, ct  0, lt  0 and kt  0 are consumption,
leisure and physical capital stock at time t, respectively, and ui > 0, uii < 0, uij  0, for
i; j 2 fc; l; kg with i 6= j.3 The household is endowed with one unit of time per period that
can be used for leisure lt and labor nt:
lt + nt = 1: (2)
The single good is produced with labor nt and capital kt. Output can be consumed by
households, used by the government, or used to augment the capital stock. The resource
constraint is
ct + gt + kt+1 = F (kt; nt) + (1  k)kt; (3)
where k 2 (0; 1) denotes the depreciation rate of capital and fgg
1
t=0 is an exogenous se-
quence of government purchases. We assume that a standard increasing and concave pro-
duction function that exhibits constant return to scale. By Eulers theorem on homogeneous
functions, linear homogeneity of F implies F (kt; nt) = Fk(kt; nt)kt + Fn(kt; nt)nt.
Government. The government nances its stream of purchases fgtg
1
t=0 by levying at-
rate, time varying taxes on earnings from capital at rate  kt and earnings from labor at rate
nt . The government can also trade one-period bonds
4, sequential trading of which su¢ces
to accomplish any intertemporal trade in a world without uncertainty. Let bt be government
indebtedness to the private sector, denominated in time t-goods, maturing at the beginning
of period t. The governments budget constraint is
gt = 
k
t rtkt + 
n
t wtnt +
bt+1
Rt
  bt; (4)
where rt and wt are the market-determined rental rate of capital and the wage rate for labor,
respectively, denominated in units of time t goods, and Rt is the gross rate of return on
one-period bonds held from t to t + 1. Interest earnings on bonds are assumed to be tax
exempt; this assumption is innocuous for bond exchanges between the government and the
private sector. We assume that the government can commit fully and credibly to future tax
rates and thus evade the issue of time-consistency raised in Kydland and Prescott (1977).5
3uii < 0 shows that the marginal utility of any commodity decreases in its own consumption, while
uij > 0 (i 6= j) displays that the marginal utility of one commodity increases in the consumption of any
other commodity.
4One-period governmeng bond cannot be accumulated like the private capital. This is why we do not
introduce government bond into the utility function of the representative consumer.
5Xie (1997) raise the time inconsistency problem in the Ramsey taxation problem.
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Households. A representative household chooses fct; lt; kt+1; bt+1g
1
t=0 to maximizes expres-
sion (1) subject to the time allocation constraint (2) and the sequence of budget constraints
ct + kt+1 +
bt+1
Rt
= (1   kt )rtkt + (1  
n
t )wtnt + (1  k)kt + bt; (5)
for t  0, given k0 and b0. Here, bt is the real value of one-period government bond holdings
that mature at the beginning of period t, denominated in units of time t consumption.
Substituting (2) into (1) and forming the Lagrangian with the Lagrange multiplier t, we
derive the rst order conditions w.r.t ct; nt; kt+1 and bt+1, respectively,
6
uc(t) = t; t  0; (6)
ul(t) = t(1  
n
t )wt; t  0; (7)
t = 

uk(t+ 1) + t+1[(1  
k
t+1)rt+1 + 1  k]
	
; t  0; (8)
t
Rt
= t+1; t  0: (9)
From equations (6) and (7), we have
ul(t)
uc(t)
= (1  nt )wt; (10)
which displays that the marginal rate of substitution of consumption and leisure equals their
(after-tax) price ratio. Combining equations (6) and (8) yields us the consumption Euler
equation
uc(t) = 

uk(t+ 1) + uc (t+ 1) [(1  
k
t+1)rt+1 + 1  k]
	
; (11)
in which the demand for status (uk > 0) is a new channel for savings.
7 Putting equation (9)
into (8) leads to the modied no-arbitrage condition
Rt =
(1   kt+1)rt+1 + 1  kh
1   uk(t+1)
uc(t)
i ; (12)
where a new positive term  uk(t+1)
uc(t)
is present in the denominator.
Firms. In each period, by taking (rt; wt) as given, the representative rm rents capital
and labor from households and maximizes its prots, i.e., F (kt; nt)   rtkt   wtnt. The rst
order conditions for this problem are
rt = Fk(kt; nt); wt = Fn(kt; nt): (13)
In words, inputs should be employed until the marginal product of the last unit is equal to
its rental price. With constant return to scale, we get the standard result that pure prots
are zero.
6Let uc (t) and ul (t) denote the time t values of the derivatives of u (ct; lt) with respect to consumption
and leisure, respectively.
7This new savings motive can be seen more clearly from the steady state version of equation (11) without
taxes, namely, Fk = 1=   1 + k   uk=uc. The marginal product of capital is Fk lower than the one in the
standard model without the spirit of captalism, due to a new positive term uk=uc (> 0) here.
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2.2 Primal approach to the Ramsey problem
We examine the optimal taxes in the long run by utilizing the Primal approach developed
by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) and Lucas and Stokey (1983). For this purpose we present
the following useful denitions.
Denition 2.1 A competive equilibrium is an allocation fct; lt; nt; kt+1; bt+1g
1
t=0, a price sys-
tem fwt; rt; Rtg
1
t=0, and government policies

gt; 
k
t ; 
n
t ; Bt+1
	1
t=0
such that (a) given
the price system and the government poicy, the allocation solves both the rms problem
and the households problem with bt = Bt for all t  0; (b) given the allocation and
the price system, the government policy satises the sequence of government budget
constraint (4) for all t  0; (3) the time allocation constraint (2) and the resource
constraint (3) are satised for all t  0.
There are many competitive equilibria, indexed by di¤erent government policies. And
this multiplicity motivates the Ramsey problem.
Denition 2.2 Given k0, b0 and 
k
0 , the Ramsey problem is to choose a competitive equi-
librium that maximizes expression (1).
Firstly, we derive the following implementability condition8
1X
t=0
t[uc(t)ct  ul(t)nt+ uk(t)kt] = uc(0)f[(1  
k
0 )r0+1  k]k0+ b0g+ uk(0)k0  eA1: (14)
Then, the Ramsey problem is to maximize expression (1) subject to equation (14) and the
resource constraint (3). We proceed by assuming that government expenditures are small
enough that the problem has a convex constraint set and that we can approach it using
Lagrangian methods. In particular, let  be the Lagrangian multiplier on equation (14) and
dene
U(t)  U(ct; nt; kt;)  u(ct; 1  nt; kt) + [uc(t)ct   ul(t)nt + uk(t)kt]:
Then we can construct the Lagrangian
J =
1X
t=0
tfU(t) + t[F (kt; nt)  ct   gt   kt+1 + (1  k)kt]g    eA1;
where ftg
1
t=0 is a sequence of Lagrangian multipliers. The rst order conditions for this
problem are
ct : Uc(t) = t; t  1 (15)
kt+1 : t = fUk(t+ 1) + t+1[Fk(t+ 1) + 1  k]g; t  0 (16)
nt :  Un(t) = tFn(t); t  1 (17)
8The derivation of the implementability condition is placed in appendix A.
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where
Uc(t) = uc(t) + [ucc(t)ct + uc(t)  ulc(t)nt + ukc(t)kt];
Un(t) =  ul(t) + [ ucl(t)ct + ull (t)nt   ul(t)  ulk(t)kt];
Uk(t+ 1) = uk(t+ 1) + [uck(t+ 1)ct+1   ulk(t+ 1)nt+1 + ukk(t+ 1)kt+1 + uk(t+ 1)]:
Consider the special case in which there is a T  0 for which gt = g for all t  T . Assume
that there exists a solution to the Ramsey problem and that it converges to a time-invariant
allocation, so that c; n and k are constant after some time. Then we have the following
Proposition 2.1 Suppose the economy converges to an interior steady state in the dynamic
taxation model with the spirit of capitalism.9 The optimal capital income tax is positive,
zero, or negative, if and only if (uk1   uc3) is larger than, equal to, or less than zero.
Namely,
 k
>
=
<
0() (uk1   uc2)
>
=
<
0; (18)
where
1 = uccc  ulcn+ ukck; ; 2 = uckc  ulkn+ ukkk:
Proof The proof is placed in online Appendix A. 
Proposition 2.1 tells that the limiting capital income tax is in general not zero, since the
term (uk1   uc2) is generally not equal to zero. It should be noted that the sign of the
optimal capital tax rate relies only on the specication of the utility function rather than
the production technology. That is, if the consumer cares about the utility from both social
status and consumption, then the zero capital income taxation theorem will not hold. If
there is no status concern (i.e., uk = 0), then the limiting capital income tax is zero (i.e.,
 k = 0), and the corresponding labor income tax is nonnegative (i.e., n  0),10 which
corresponds to the zero capital income taxation developed by Chamley (1986).
For this general utility function, the expression of the term (uk1   uc2) is very com-
plicated and hard to develop the intuitions. For this purpose, we assume the instantaneous
utility function of the representative consumer is of an additively separable version, namely,
u(c; l; k) = cu (c) + nv (1  n) + kw (k) ; i > 0; i 2 fc; n; kg : (19)
Then we know that u0 > 0, u00 < 0, v0 > 0, v00 < 0, w0 > 0, and w00 < 0, due to the assumed
properties of u(c; l; k). Then we have
9Di¤erent from the standard Ramsey model, we now cannot prove the existence and uniqueness of the
steady state. In our model, the steady state version of the consumption Euler equation is 1= = uk=uc +
[(1  k)Fk+1  k]. The new term uk=uc prevents us from solving the steady state easily and brings about
the possibility of multiple equilibria, as Kurz (1968) had already talked about this. For this reason, our
paper assumes the existence of a steady state and focuses on the taxation problem.
10Notice that, if uk = 0, then the term uk1   uc3 = 0, implying 
k = 0; meanwhile, n =
1
ucFn

1+
[(ucl   Fnucc) c+ ( ull + Fnulc)n]  0, due to uc > 0, Fn > 0, ucl  0, ucc < 0, ull < 0 and
ulc  0.
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Proposition 2.2 Assume that the utility function of the representative consumer takes the
additively separable version in (19). The optimal capital income tax is positive, zero,
or negative, if and only if the capital elasticity of marginal utility of capital is less than,
equal to, or larger than the consumption elasticity of marginal utility of consumption.
Namely,
 k
>
=
<
0()
w00 (k) k
w0 (k)
<
=
>
u00 (c) c
u0 (c)
:
Proof Putting the additively separable utility function in (18) yields us the results.
Proposition 2.1 shows that optimal taxes depend on the relative values of the marginal
utility elasticities for di¤erent utility goods (consumption goods and capital goods). If the
marginal utility of capital responses more sensitively to one percent change of capital stock,
compared to the response of the marginal utility of consumption to one percent change of
consumption, then the optimal capital tax will be positive; if not, the optimal capital tax will
be negative. However, if they (consumption and capital goods) have the same sensitivity,
then the optimal capital tax will be zero.
Roughly speaking, we may also develop the following intuitions. If we look down upon
these marginal utilities as their shadow prices, namely, ui (c; l; k) = i, i 2 fc; l; kg, then we
will be able to dene the price elasticities of demand for them, namely, i   
@i
@i
i
i
, i 2
fc; l; kg. Simple calculations gives rise to c =  u
0 (c) =u00 (c) c, n =  v
0 (1  n) =v00 (1  n)n,
and k =  w
0 (k) =w00 (k) k. Thus if the price elasticity of demand for capital is less than
that for consumption, then the optimal capital income tax will be positive; conversely, if the
price elasticity of demand for capital is larger than that for consumption, then the optimal
capital income tax will be negative. In the latter case, the government provides subsidies for
the larger welfare loss of the high substitution e¤ect driven by price changes.
To explore how the spirit of capitalism a¤ects the optimal capital taxes, we will extend
the baseline model to include two types of physical capitals: one, kt, with interest rate rt and
depreciation rate k, enters the utility, and the other, t, with interest rate r

t depreciation
rate , does not enter the utility function. We also assume that the production function of
the economy, F (kt; t; nt), is linearly homogenous on three production factors (kt; t; nt). It
is shown in Proposition 2.3 that the limiting tax rate on rt of physical capital with status
concerns is indenite and the one on rt of other physical capitals without status concerns is
zero.
Proposition 2.3 (Two Types of Physical Capitals) If the steady state exists in the extended
model with two types of physical capitals, then the limiting tax on capital with status
concerns is indenite and pinned down by equation (18), the limiting tax on capital
without status concerns equals zero.11
11In the taxation equations with two types of physical capital, all of the partial derivatives depend on ,
namely, Fi = Fi (k; ; n), i 2 fk; ; ng. The proof of Proposition 2.3 is similar to the proof of Proposition 1
and omitted here, which is available upon request.
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3 Heterogeneous agents
In this section we extend the model to more realistic settings with heterogeneous agents
and also show that the limiting capital income tax is not zero generally. Each agent is a
point in the unit interval [0; 1]. There are two types of agents, capitalists/entrepreneurs
and workers, with exogenously given weights  and 1   , respectively. Endowed with the
spirit of capitalism, entrepreneurs save and trade with the government. But they do not
work. Workers work for salaries and derive utility from consumption and leisure. We use
superscripts 1 and 2 to denote capitalists and workers respectively. Both capitalists and
workers discount the future with a common discount factor  2 (0; 1). Firms hire labor
from workers, rent capital from capitalists and produce the nal goods with the linearly
homogenous production technology F (k1t ; n
2
t ).
The representative capitalist solves the following maximization problem:
max
fc1
t
;k1
t+1
;b1
t+1
g1
t=0
1X
t=0
tu1(c1t ; k
1
t ); s:t:c
1
t + k
1
t+1   (1  )k
1
t = (1  
k
t )rtk
1
t + bt  
bt+1
Rt
;
and the representative worker solves
max
fc2
t
;n2
t
g1
t=0
1X
t=0
tu2(c2t ; 1  n
2
t ); s:t:; c
2
t = (1  
n
t )wtn
2
t :
The government nances its expenditures fgtg
1
t=0 with tax revenues and one-period bonds
and runs a balanced budget
gt = 
k
t rtk
1
t + 
n
t wtn
2
t +
bt+1
Rt
  bt:
The resource constraint of the economy is
c1t + c
2
t + k
1
t+1   (1  )k
1
t + gt = F
 
k1t ; n
2
t

: (20)
From the rst order conditions for the representative capitalist, we have the consumption
Euler equation
u1c (t) = 

u1k (t+ 1) + u
1
c (t+ 1)

(1   kt+1)rt+1 + (1  )
	
; (21)
and the no-arbitrage condition
Rt =
(1   kt+1)rt+1 + 1  
1  u1k(t+ 1)=u
1
c (t)
:
The optimization of the representative worker is described by the static equation
u2l (c
2
t ; 1  n
2
t )
u2c(c
2
t ; 1  n
2
t )
= (1  nt )wt =
c2t
n2t
: (22)
The implementability condition can be derived as follows
1X
t=0
t[u1c(t)c
1
t + u
1
k(t)k
1
t ] = u
1
c(0)f[(1  
k
0 )r0 + 1  ]k
1
0 + b0g+ u
1
k(0)k
1
0  eA2: (23)
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The Ramsey problem is to maximize a weighted sum of utilities with weights  on
capitalists and (1  ) on workers
max
fc1t ;c2t ;k1t+1;n2tg
1X
t=0
t

u1(c1t ; k
1
t ) + (1  ) u
2(c2t ; 1  n
2
t )

;
subject to the implementability condition (23), the static optimization condition of the
worker (22), i.e., u2c (t) c
2
t = u
2
l (t)n
2
t , and the resource constraint (20).
Solving the Ramsey problem and comparing the optimality conditions with the individ-
uals problem lead to the following
Proposition 3.1 Assume that there exists an interior steady state in the economy with
heterogeneous agents. The optimal capital income tax is positive, zero, or negative, if
and only if (u1k%1   u
1
c%2) is larger than, equal to, or less than zero, namely,
 k
>
=
<
0()
 
u1k%1   u
1
c%2
 >
=
<
0; (24)
where
%1 

u1cc (t) c
1
t + u
1
kc (t) k
1
t

; %2 

u1kk (t+ 1) k
1
t+1 + u
1
ck (t+ 1) c
1
t+1

:
Proof The proof is put in online Appendix B.
Proposition 3.2 Assume that the utility function of the representative consumer takes the
additively separable functions, namely, u1(c1t ; k
1
t ) = cu
1(c1t ) +kw (k
1
t ), and u
2(c2t ; 1 
n2t ) = cu
2(c2t ) + nw (1  n
2
t ). Then the optimal taxes are determined by
 k
>
=
<
0()
w100 (k1) k1
w10 (k1)
<
=
>
u100 (c1) c1
u10 (c1)
:
Proposition 4.1 and Proposition 4.2 show that in the more realistic setting with heteroge-
neous agents, we draw very similar conclusion for the optimal capital income taxation: zero
capital income taxation theorem does not hold generally, and the optimal capital income tax
depends on the particular forms of the utility function and closely related to the associated
elasiticities. The intuitions are also similar to the baseline model.
4 Conclusion
We reexamine the Chamley-Judd zero optimal capital income taxation theorem in the new
settings populated with agents endowed with spirit of capitalism. We nd that the limiting
capital income tax is not zero generally and depends only on the specication of the utility
function but not on the production side of the economy. Furthermore, the similar formulas of
optimal capital taxes are derived in extended settings with multiple physical capitals or with
heterogeneous agents (capitalists and workers). This research puts forward a new channel
to overturn the Chamley-Judd theorem.
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5 Online appendix (not for publication)
5.1 Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 2.1
Proof of Proposition 2.1. We rst derive the implementability condition. Dene the Arrow-
Debreu price q0t 
Pt 1
i=0R
 1
i for t  1, with the numeraire q
0
0 = 1. From the consumers rst
order conditions uc(t) = t and
t
Rt
= t+1, we have
q0t = 
t uc (t)
uc (0)
: (25)
Iterating the households ow budget constraint from the time 0, we obtain the present-value
budget constraint that
b0 =
1X
t=0
q0t
8><>:ct   (1  nt )wtnt + kt+1    1   kt  rt + 1   kt| {z }
xt
9>=>;+ limT!1 q0t bT : (26)
The term
P1
t=0 q
0
t xt in (26) is derived as
1X
t=0
q0t xt (27)
=
1X
t=0
q0t

kt+1  
 
1   kt

rt + 1  

kt
	
= lim
T!1
TX
t=0
q0t

kt+1  
 
1   kt

rt + 1  

kt
	
= lim
T!1
(
TX
t=0
q0t kt+1  
TX
t=1
q0t
 
1   kt

rt + 1  

kt
)
 
 
1   k0

r0 + 1  

k0
= lim
T!1
T 1X
t=0

q0t   q
0
t+1
 
1   kt+1

rt+1 + 1  
	
kt+1  
 
1   k0

r0 + 1  

k0 + lim
T!1
q0TkT+1
=
1X
t=0

q0t   q
0
t+1
 
1   kt+1

rt+1 + 1  
	
kt+1  
 
1   k0

r0 + 1  

k0 + lim
T!1
q0TkT+1:
Substituting uc(t) = t and
t
Rt
= t+1 in the modied no-arbitrage condition leads to:
Rt  

(1   kt+1)rt+1 + 1  k

=
uk(t+ 1)
uc (t+ 1)
: (28)
Multiplying both sides of (28) with q0t+1 and using the denition of the Arrow-Debreu price,
we have
q0t   q
0
t+1

(1   kt+1)rt+1 + 1  k

= q0t+1
uk(t+ 1)
uc (t+ 1)
: (29)
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Plugging (29) in the term (27) gives rise to
1X
t=0
q0t xt =
1X
t=0
q0t+1
uk(t+ 1)
uc (t+ 1)
kt+1  
 
1   k0

r0 + 1  

k0 + lim
T!1
q0TkT+1: (30)
Substituting (30) into equation (26) and imposing the following two transversality con-
ditions
lim
T!1
q0t bT = 0; lim
T!1
q0TkT+1 = 0;
we obtain the present-value budget constraint of the representative consumer
1X
t=0

q0t ct + q
0
t+1
uk (t+ 1)
uc (t+ 1)
kt+1

=
1X
t=0
q0t (1  
n
t )wtnt +
 
1   k0

r0 + 1  

k0 + b0: (31)
Substituting the price equations (25) and ul(t)
uc(t)
= (1   nt )wt into (31) and rearranging,
we have the implementability condition:
1X
t=0
t[uc(t)ct   ul(t)nt + uk(t)kt] = uc(0)f[(1  
k
0 )r0 + 1  k]k0 + b0g+ uk(0)k0 
eA1 (32)
Secondly, to solve the Ramsey problem, we form the Lagrangian
J =
1X
t=0
tfU(t) + t[F (kt; nt)  ct   gt   kt+1 + (1  k)kt]g    eA1:
Note that
U(t)  U(ct; nt; kt;)  u(ct; 1  nt; kt) + [uc(t)ct   ul(t)nt + uk(t)kt];
where  is the Lagrangian multiplier w.r.t the IMC and ftg
1
t=0 is a sequence of Lagrangian
multipliers. The rst order conditions are
ct : Uc(t) = t; t  1 (33)
kt+1 : t = fUk(t+ 1) + t+1[Fk(t+ 1) + 1  k]g; t  0 (34)
nt :  Un(t) = tFn(t); t  1 (35)
where
Uc(t) = uc(t) + [ucc(t)ct + uc(t)  ulc(t)nt + ukc(t)kt];
Un(t) =  ul(t) + [ ucl(t)ct + ull (t)nt   ul(t)  ulk(t)kt];
Uk(t+ 1) = uk(t+ 1) + [uck(t+ 1)ct+1   ulk(t+ 1)nt+1 + ukk(t+ 1)kt+1 + uk(t+ 1)]:
Finally, we examine the steady state of the economy. The steady state versions for equations
(33)-(35) are
 = (1 + )uc + (uccc  ulcn+ ukck)| {z }
1
; (36)
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[1  (Fk + 1  k)] = [(1 + )uk + (uckc  ulkn+ ukkk| {z })
2
]; (37)
Fn = (1 + )ul + (uclc  ulln+ uklk)| {z }
3
: (38)
From equations (36) and (38), we solve for (1+)

and 

as follows:
(1 + )

=
3   Fn1
uc3   ul1
;


=
ucFn   ul
uc3   ul1
: (39)
From the consumption Euler equation, we know that
Fk + 1  k =
1

 
uk
uc
+  kFk: (40)
Dividing both sides of (37) by  and plugging (39) and (40) into it, we obtain
 k =
1
ucFk
(ucFn   ul)
(uc3   ul1)| {z }
=

(uk1   uc2) : (41)
From equation(39), the term (ucFn   ul) = (uc3   ul1) =


is nonnegative, because the
Lagrange multiplier  is nonnegative, while the insatiable utility function implies that  is
strictly positive. Notice that uc and Fk are both strictly positive. Hence the sign of the
limiting capital income tax is determined completely by the sign of the term (uk1   uc2).
To examine the optimal labor income tax, we combine (36) with (38), rearrange the terms,
and obtain
ucFn   ul =

1 + 
(3   Fn1) : (42)
Substituting the marginal productivity condition of the rm into ul(t)
uc(t)
= (1  nt )wt gives
us
ucFn   ul = 
nucFn: (43)
Combining (42) with (43) leads to
n =
1
ucFn

1 + 
(3   Fn1) : (44)
Since uc > 0, Fn > 0 and the multiplier  is nonnegative, the limiting optimal labor
income tax depends on the value of the term in the bracket, listed in the theorem.
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5.2 Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 3.1
Proof of Proposition 3.1. To solve the Ramsey problem, we construct the Lagrangian
L =
1X
t=0
t

u1(c1t ; k
1
t ) + (1  ) u
2(c2t ; 1  n
2
t )

+ b" 1X
t=0
t[u1c(t)c
1
t + u
1
k(t)k
1
t ]  eA2
#
+
1X
t=0
tt

u2l (t)n
2
t   u
2
c (t) c
2
t

+
1X
t=0
tt

F
 
k1t ; n
2
t

  c1t   c
2
t   k
1
t+1 + (1  )k
1
t   gt

;
where b, ftg1t=0 and ftg1t=0 are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the implementabil-
ity condition, the optimality condition of the worker, and the resource constraint, respec-
tively. The optimality conditions w.r.t c1t , k
1
t+1, c
2
t , and n
2
t are:
 + bu1c(t) + bu1cc (t) c1t + u1kc (t) k1t | {z }
%1
= t; t  1; (45)

8><>:

 + bu1k(t+ 1) + bu1kk (t+ 1) k1t+1 + u1ck (t+ 1) c1t+1| {z }
%2
9>=>; = t t+1 [Fk (t+ 1) + 1  ] ; t  0;
(46)
(1    t) u
2
c(t) + t

u2lc (t)n
2
t   u
2
cc (t) c
2
t
| {z }
%3
= t; t  0; (47)
(1    t) u
2
l (t) + t

u2ll (t)n
2
t   u
2
cl (t) c
2
t
| {z }
%4
= tFn (t) ; t  0: (48)
Suppose that the economy converges to an interior steady state. Combining the steady
state equations of the consumption Euler equation of the capitalist and (46) yields us
 k =
1
Fk
"
u1k
u1c
 
 + b

u1k  
b

%2
#
: (49)
Solving equation (45) for

 + b = = 1  b%1= =u1c and putting it into (49), we
solve for
 k =
b

1
u1cFk
 
u1k%1   u
1
c%2

: (50)
To search for the limiting labor income tax, we combine equations (47) and (48) to derive
u2l
u2c
=
(Fn   %3)
(   %2)
: (51)
Substituting (51) into the optimality condition of the representative worker, we obtain the
formula for the limiting labor income tax
n =
%4   %3Fn
Fn

   %3
: (52)
The proof is completed. 
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